Saundra Brower and Frank Oscar Brower v. Dr. David W. Brown, and I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a corporation, and I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a corporation dba Valley View Medical Center : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2002
Saundra Brower and Frank Oscar Brower v. Dr.
David W. Brown, and I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a
corporation, and I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a
corporation dba Valley View Medical Center : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jody K. Burnett; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Charles W. Dahlquist, II, Norman J. Younker;
Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell; Attorneys for Resondent.
Russell A. Cannon; Cannon and Wilkinson; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Brower v. Brown, No. 20553.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2026
iJTAH CUrr.I?.*2 COURT 
p p p p j a j 
45.9 
.89 ' 
nnnicPTMn JpoXXtf* 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DR. DAVID W. BROWN, and 
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., a u a s e wo- Z U D D J 
corporation, and I.H.C. 
HOSPITALS, INC., a 
corporation dba VALLEY VIEW 
MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DR. DAVID W. BROWN 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, 
Judge Allen B. Sorensen 
Charles W. Dahlquist, II Jody K. Burnett 
Norman J. Younker Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 10 Exchange Place 
330 South 300 East Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 P.O. Box 3000 
Attorneys for Defendant- Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Respondent I.H.C. Hospitals, Attorneys for Defendant-
I n c , a corporation and I.H.C. Respondent Dr. David W. 
Hospitals, Inc., a corporation Brown 
doing business as Valley 
View Medical Center 
Russell A. Cannon 
Cannon & Wilkinson 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower mumm u prrr- rmn 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 E & | | F* I B 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs- | -f.XI L-# 
Appellants Saundra Brower and CIQOC 
Frank Oscar Brower OCT 151985 Cleric, Supreme Court Utah Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DR. DAVID W. BROWN, and Case No, 20553 
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., a 
corporation, and I.H.C 
HOSPITALS, INC., a 
corporation dba VALLEY 
VIEW MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendants- -Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DR. DAVID W BROWN 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, 
Judge Allen B. Sorensen 
Charles W. Dahlqui. Jody K. Burnett 
Norman J. Younker Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 10 Exchange Place 
330 South 300 East Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 P. O. Box 3000 
Attorneys for Defendant- Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Respondent I.H.C. Hospitals, Attorneys for Defendant-
Inc., a corporation and I.H.C. Respondent Dr. David W. 
Hospitals, Inc, a corporation Brown 
doing business as Valley 
View Medical Center 
Russell A. Cannon 
Cannon & Wilkinson 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants Saundra Brower and 
Frank Oscar Brower Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
J^i« 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . 
STATEMENT * 
STATEMENT - *-.- 'Pi • . . . . 
TEMENT" 
SUMMARY V>- ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
BROWERS HAD FAILED TO COMMENCE THIS ACTION 
WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER THEY DISCOVERED, OR 
THROUGH THE USE OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE 
SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED, THEIR LEGAL INJURY 
ATTRIBUTED TO THE CARE AND TREATMENT RENDERED 
BY DR. BROWN 
The Browers Knew Or Should Have Known 
Of The Injury To Mrs. Brower's Leg On 
October 22, 1980, And Of The Possibility 
That Injury May Have Been Caused By The 
Negligence Of Dr. Brown 
£>. Based On Her Prior Medical History And 
Understanding Prior To The Surgical 
Hysterectomy, Mrs. Brower Knew Or Should 
Have Known As Of November 25, 1980, The 
Last Day On Which She Had Contact With 
Dr. Brown, That She Had Sustained A Legal 
Injury Relating To The Hysterectomy 
Itself Or His Care And Treatment Before 
And After The Surgery ) 
CONCLUSION 2 
(* * 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Duncan v. Augter, 661 P.2d 83 (Or. App. 1983) . . . . . . 9, 11 
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979) 9 
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) 9, 10 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended) 1,2,7,9 
(ii) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SAUNDRA BROWER and 
FRANK OSCAR BROWER, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
DR. DAVID W. BROWN, and Case No. 20553 
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., a 
corporation, and I.H.C. 
HOSPITALS, INC., a 
corporation dba VALLEY 
VIEW MEDICAL CENTER, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DR. DAVID W. BROWN 
i . . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The only issue properly raised by this appeal is whether 
plaintiffs-appellants commenced this medical malpractice action 
against defendant-respondent Dr. David W. Brown within two 
years of the time they discovered, or through the use of rea-
sonable diligence should have discovered, that Mrs. Brower had 
sustained an injury allegedly resulting from her care and 
treatment by Dr. David W. Brown. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, 
(1953, as amended). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for medical malpractice brought by plain-
tiffs-appellants Saundra Brower and Frank Oscar Brower (herein-
after "Browers") against Dr. David W. Brown arising out of 
injuries allegedly sustained in connection with a hysterectomy 
operation (excising the uterus) performed by Dr. Brown on 
plaintiff Saundra Brower on October 22, 1980, at the Valley 
View Medical Center in Cedar City, Utah. 
Dr. Brown moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the 
Browers' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tions contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended), requiring that such 
actions be commenced within two years of the time a patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered the injury. Following the submission of legal 
memoranda and oral argument, the District Court, the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen presiding, granted Dr. Brown's motion and 
entered summary judgment in his behalf by order dated January 
4, 1985. The Browers now appeal from that summary judgment. 
The District Court also granted summary judgment for defen-
dant-respondent I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., dba Valley View Medical 
Center and denied the Browers' motion for partial summary judg-
ment to the effect that their cause of action was not barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Brown incorporates herein by this reference the State-
ment of Facts contained in the Brief of Respondent Valley View 
Medical Center with respect to Saundra Brower1s leg injury and 
provides the following supplementation of facts which apply to 
the other aspects of the plaintiffs1 claims against Dr. Brown. 
Saundra Brower first began experiencing irregular menstrua-
tion and related problems at the comparatively early age of 17 
or 18 and was first diagnosed as having endometriosis (a condi-
tion in which tissue more or less perfectly resembling the 
uterine mucous membrane occurs aberrantly in various locations 
in the pelvic cavity) in 1971 by Dr. Stephen Clark in Buena 
Park, California. (R. 153, Deposition of Saundra Brower, 
pp. 20-21). Dr. Clark performed a uterine suspension which 
temporarily resolved Mrs. Brower*s problems for a period of 
approximately two years, but in 1973 she saw Dr. Clark again 
for the same type of symptoms, which included irregular men-
strual cycles with bleeding, cramping, nausea and "knife-
stabbing pains in the groin area." Dr. Clark suggested that 
she go back on birth control pills to attempt to control these 
symptoms, but Mrs. Brower wanted to become pregnant at that 
time and as an alternative, he prescribed a fertility drug. 
(Dep. of Saundra Brower, pp. 21-28). When the same symptoms 
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continued without relief, Dr. Clark advised Mrs. Brower that if 
she were older, he would recommend a hysterectomy. (Dep. of 
Saundra Brower, p. 29). 
After moving with her family to Kanab, Utah, in approxi-
mately 1974, Mrs. Brower was under the care of Dr. Howard 
Roberts for the same type of symptoms and he also prescribed 
the use of birth control pills, but she still wanted to become 
pregnant and therefore did not want to go on birth control 
pills. In addition, birth control pills had not previously 
given her any relief from these symptoms. (Dep. of Saundra 
Brower, p. 30). 
Saundra Brower went to see Dr. Brown on the recommendation 
of her sister, Marsha Eddy, because she had previously been 
told that the only relief for the symptoms she was experiencing 
would be to have a hysterectomy performed and "I had decided to 
have a hysterectomy." She had been given that advice by both 
Dr. Clark and Dr. Roberts. (Dep. of Saundra Brower, p. 32). 
At the time Saundra Brower first consulted with Dr. Brown in 
i 
his office on October 14, 1980, she had already made the deter-
mination that she wanted to have a hysterectomy performed; and 
following examination and consultation, arrangements were made 
at that time to schedule the surgery. (Dep. of Saundra Brower, 
pp. 32-33, 37-38). 
i 
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The gravamen of the plaintiffs1 claims as against Dr. Brown 
relate to the hysterectomy itself, which was performed at 
Valley View Medical Center on October 22, 1980, as well as to 
his care and treatment prior to and following that surgery. 
(R. 1 Complaint, 1f 11-12). 
Within a couple of weeks of the surgery, Saundra Brower 
began experiencing hot flashes and rawness in the vaginal area 
which were completely new symptoms and different than any she 
had experienced before. (Dep. of Saundra Brower, p. 60). 
Neither Dr. Brown nor anyone else she had consulted had advised 
her that she might expect to experience such hot flashes and 
rawness in the vaginal area following a hysterectomy. (Dep. of 
Saundra Brower, p. 71). Prior to undergoing surgery, it was 
Saundra Brower1s understanding that her problems would be com-
pletely resolved shortly after the operation and that she would 
have an "immediate-type of recovery." (Dep. of Saundra Brower, 
pp. 70, 84). The last time that Mrs. Brower saw or spoke with 
Dr. Brown was within approximately one month of the hysterec-
tomy, on or about November 25, 1980, following the administra-
tion of a hormone injection and the prescription of vaginal 
cream, at which time he told her that there was "nothing more 
he could do for me." (Dep. of Saundra Brower, pp. 61-64; R. 
151 Dep. of Dr. David W. Brown, Exh. 1). 
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A Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action was served on 
Dr. Brown on or about February 16, 1983, and the complaint in 
this action was filed on June 14, 1983. (Complaint, 1f 8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The undisputed facts, as demonstrated by the allegations of 
the complaint and the uncontradicted testimony of Mrs. Brower, 
establish that more than two years elapsed from the date that 
the Browers discovered or should have discovered both the fact 
of her injury and the possibility that it may have been caused 
by negligence on the part of Dr. Brown. Neither the specific 
advice of a health care professional nor certainty of causation 
and negligence is required before a plaintiff may be charged 
with the knowledge that she has suffered a legal injury so that 
the two-year statute of limitations begins to run. Mrs. Brower 
knew, or should have known, of the existence of a possible 
cause of action against Dr. Brown as of her final contact with 
him on November 25, 1980, at the very latest. The service of 
the Notice of Intent to Commence Action on February 16, 1983 
and the filing of the plaintiffs' Complaint on June 14, 1983 
are beyond that two-year period and represent a failure on the 
part of the Browers to assert their claims in a timely manner, 
and this cause of action is therefore barred. 
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Furthermore, no allegations have been made, nor would the 
undisputed facts support, the conclusion that Dr. Brown has 
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged miscon-
duct so as to extend the statute of limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE BROWERS HAD FAILED TO COMMENCE THIS 
ACTION WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER THEY DIS-
COVERED, OR THROUGH THE USE OF REASONABLE 
DILIGENCE SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED, THEIR 
LEGAL INJURY ATTRIBUTED TO THE CARE AND 
TREATMENT RENDERED BY DR. BROWN. 
A. The Browers Knew Or Should Have Known Of The Injury To 
Mrs. Brower's Leg On October 22, 1980, And Of The 
Possibility That Injury May Have Been Caused By The 
Negligence Of Dr. Brown. 
In the interest of brevity, Dr. Brown incorporates the 
argument with respect to Mrs. Brower's leg injury contained in 
the brief of respondent Valley View Medical Center. The focus 
of that inquiry is clearly undisputed testimony from 
Mrs. Brower that on the day of the operation she knew that 
there was a problem and that something had happened that was 
improper. (Dep. of Saundra Brower, pp. 120-121). 
The Browers make the bald allegation that there was active 
concealment of the negligence of the defendants which resulted 
in the tolling of the two year statute of limitations under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(l)(b) (1953, as amended), but the com-
plaint simply contains the conclusory allegation in 1f 21 that 
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Dr. Brown wrongfully concealed from plaintiffs his careless and 
negligent acts. The sole piece of evidence that even peripher-
ally relates to this claim is the testimony of Saundra Brower 
that while she was still in the hospital shortly following sur-
gery , she asked Dr. Brown what happened to her leg and he 
replied "I don't know, but I'll find out." (Dep. of Saundra 
Brower, p. 51). 
That conversation occurred after Mrs. Brower had been 
advised by the anesthesiologist that the leg injury did not 
occur in the operating room, but following the conclusion of 
surgery in the recovery room. (Dep. of Saundra Brower, 
pp. 50-51). The suggestion that the failure to followup on a 
request for information from a patient on a matter as to which 
the individual physician has no apparent knowledge or involve-
ment somehow amounts to active or fraudulent concealment is 
totally without merit, either legally or factually. 
In their brief, the Browers assert that Mrs. Brower was 
somehow mislead by Dr. Brown's statement into thinking this was 
a routine situation following her type of surgery and hospital-
ization but that proposition flies squarely in the face of her 
undisputed testimony that she clearly knew this problem was 
totally unrelated to the surgery and that something improper 
had happened. 
I 
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As one court faced with a similar issue has stated: 
A defendant's misrepresentations do not delay the 
running of the statute of limitations if the plaintiff 
knew or should have known that she had a cause of 
action despite the representations. 
Duncan v. Auqter, 661 P.2d 83, 87 (Or. App. 1983). 
B, Based On Her Prior Medical History And Understanding 
Prior To The Surgical Hysterectomy, Mrs. Brower Knew 
Or Should Have Known As Of November 25, 1980, The Last 
Day On Which She Had Contact With Dr. Brown, That She 
Had Sustained A Legal Injury Relating To The Hysterec-
tomy Itself Or His Care And Treatment Before And After 
The Surgery. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides that a mal-
practice action against a health care provider is barred 
"unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs 
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, amended). This court 
has previously interpreted that provision to mean that the 
limitations period begins to run when an injured person knows 
or should know that she has suffered a "legal injury." Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979). In that decision, 
the court further held that discovery of "injury" as used in 
the applicable statute entails both discovery of the physical 
injury and the possibility that the injury may have been caused 
by negligence on the part of the health care provider. Id. at 
148; See also Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
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While Mrs. Brower's testimony regarding her previous medi-
cal history may not be directly relevant to the allegations of 
malpractice against Dr. Brown, it provides valuable insight as 
to her knowledge and level of understanding regarding her own 
medical condition. Such facts are also significant when viewed 
in light of the unanticipated difficulties she encountered fol-
lowing surgery which were also substantially different from any 
symptoms she had previously experienced. 
The affidavit of Saundra Brower, in which she states what 
amounts to a self-serving legal conclusion that she did not 
discover the negligence of the defendants or that she had sus-
tained a legal injury until July of 1981, is contradictory to 
her deposition testimony and fails to raise any material issues 
of fact. When faced with a similar "declaration of belief* in 
Reiser v. Lohner, supra at 100, this court stated: 
Mr. Reiser filed an affidavit wherein he asserted a 
belief that his wife's disorders were temporary and 
that he did not become aware of any permanent damage 
until June, 1972. Such declaration of his belief was 
not sufficient to raise an issue of fact. Further-
more, the very acknowledgement that his wife was suf-
fering disorders as a result of the incident (whether 
temporary or permanent) would show that plaintiffs 
should have known that they suffered legal injury at 
the time of the cardiac arrest. (Emphasis in ori-
ginal. ) 
The only logical and objective conclusion to be drawn from 
the undisputed facts in this case is that the Browers were 
similarly situated so as to be aware of "disorders" which 
-10-
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should have lead even an untutored layman to the conclusion 
that there might possibly be a connection between those 
problems and the treatment of Dr. Brown. 
The Browers ask this court to adopt a standard which would 
essentially require that a plaintiff have the equivalent of 
expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care, the 
violation of that standard, and whether it resulted in damage 
to the plaintiff before the two year period of the statute of 
limitations could begin to run. While such expert testimony is 
clearly required at trial, it was never intended to be the kind 
of practical inquiry contemplated in determining whether one 
knew or should have known of the existence of an injury so as 
to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. 
The practical nature of this threshold inquiry was aptly 
stated in Duncan v. Augter, supra, at 86: 
To start the running of the statute of limitations, a 
plaintiff need not have knowledge of facts that, if 
proved, would convince every reasonable factfinder 
that plaintiff should win. It is sufficient that a 
plaintiff have knowledge, actual or implied, of facts 
that, if proved, will at least raise an issue of fact 
on each element of the claim. Therefore, a plaintiff 
has discovered a cause of action and [the statute of 
limitations] begins to run when he knows, or should 
know through diligent inquiry, facts from which a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the plain-
tiff's injury was caused by an act of the defendant 
that was somehow negligent. 
By the date of her last contact with Dr. Brown, as of 
November 25, 1980, Mrs. Brower had full knowledge that she was 
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experiencing difficulties clearly associated with the surgical 
procedure Dr. Brown had performed and which were totally 
unanticipated and different from any symptoms she had pre-
viously encountered. Dr. Brown had advised her that there was 
nothing more he could do for her. As a result, by that date at 
the latest, she knew or should have known facts from which a 
reasonable person arguably could find that her "injuries," as 
encompassing both the leg wound and the unanticipated complica-
tions following surgery which she has described, may have been 
somehow related to the treatment of Dr. Brown. 
Therefore, the filing of the notice of the intent to com-
mence action on February 16, 1983, and the filing of the plain-
tiff's complaint on June 14, 1983, were beyond the period of 
time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations and are 
barred. 
CONCLUSION 
Both the language of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
and the prior holdings of this court support the District 
Court's determination that the undisputed facts in this case 
establish that the Browers had knowledge or should have known 
more than two years prior to the time their action was com-
menced that they had suffered an injury which may have been the 
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result of negligence on the part of Dr. Brown. The judgement 
of the lower court to that effect should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /v^day of October, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By L ?< sW&f-
Jody Xr B^mnet€ 
Attorneys xor Defendant-
Respondent Dr. David W. Brown 
SCM1497U 
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Pursuant to Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure for the Supreme Court of Utahf Jody K. Burnett, 
attorney for Respondent, Dr. David W. Brown, hereby certifies 
that on the 14th day of October, 1985, he caused four copies 
of the Brief of Respondent to be served on counsel for each 
party, addressed as follows: 
Charles W. Dahlquist, II 
Norman J. Younker 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Russell A. Cannon 
Cannon & Wilkinson 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent I.H.C. Hospitals, 
Inc., a corporation and 
I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a 
corporation doing business 
as Valley View Medical Center.) 
(Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants Saundra Brower 
and Frank Oscar Brower) 
Dated this day of A^iA^tMhu.i 985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By £K <^w4f~-Jody K/JSuri 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Dr. David W. Brown 
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